






Bridging the gap between information security 
risk assessments and enterprise risk 
management 
How to ensure a balanced reporting of information security 















It is challenging to feed today’s information security risk assessments into an overall ERM 
framework such that it can be presented to stakeholders and management. This report evaluates 
current practice for information security risk assessment as represented by IRAM2, which is a 
recognised methodology. Weaknesses have been revealed in IRAM2 related to its incompatibility 
with other reporting methods, and in its calculation methods of information risks. Improvements 
have been proposed to the inherent limitations of the methodology, but also how to increase 
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Organisations are faced with increased organisational complexity and a broad range of threat 
vectors that may interfere with their operations and objectives. Enterprise risk management 
(ERM) covers the methods and procedures that can be used to manage the risks posed by these 
threats. The focus on proper risk management, and the framework that contains it, is increasing 
throughout all types of industries. However, because of the different risk types that exist within 
an organisation there are several approaches for assessing risk, and it can be challenging for an 
organisation to successfully align these approaches when they are implemented into the 
preferred overall framework. 
As a consequence of our society’s increased application and dependency on information 
technology, the importance of information security is increasing. The information risks and 
cyber threats faced by organisations today are constantly evolving and growing at a quick pace. 
Nowadays, hacking services are bought and sold on places such as the Darknet. This leads to an 
exponential increase in threats, as the services are readily available to anyone. A hacker that 
once was characterised as a kid sitting in front of the computer in the basement, has now 
transformed into established, well-funded professionals. To keep up, organisations need to take 
a proactive approach against these threats (Oredsson, 2017). Therefore, it is crucial to have a 
robust mechanism in place that can properly communicate these risks and provide decision 
support to the top management. However, it is challenging to feed today’s information security 
risk assessments into an overall ERM framework such that it can be presented to stakeholders 
and management. There is potential for improvement of current methodologies for this 
translation of risk from information security to the overall risk management framework.  
1.1 Objectives, scope and limitations 
The objective of this report is to evaluate current practice for information security risk 
assessment as represented by IRAM2, provide suggestions on how to improve this methodology 
and to find ways of advancing how these information risks are reported to the decision makers. 
The scope of the assignment will be delimited to IRAM2. However, as the methodology is based 
on known principles within information security, the evaluation and proposed improvements 
will, to some degree, be applicable to the information security field in general. 
1.2 Report structure 
Firstly, risk theory is presented to build the foundation on which the suggestions will lean on. 
Information security, typical frameworks and standards are then introduced, before the IRAM2 
methodology is presented. Evaluation of the methodology follows, and then the suggestions for 





2 Risk theory  
Risk analysts are often faced with the challenge of describing or characterising risk that an 
organisation faces in an informative but simple manner for the management and the 
stakeholders. The analyst could be assessing different types of risks, such as if they are security 
or safety related. Depending on the scope, different perspectives and characterisations of risk 
are used. It is therefore of interest to introduce recommendations on risk conceptualisation. This 
will establish the foundation for this thesis.  
Section 2 presents general theory on risk, discusses risk as a concept and how risk can be 
described, and briefly presents risk management within enterprises.  
2.1 The concept of risk 
The concept of risk has no universally accepted definition (Aven, 2014, p. 17). For example, 
some definitions are based on expected values, while others might be based on probabilities. 
The term “risk” is used loosely and has different context-dependent meanings. This can be 
challenging for risk practitioners that need to communicate risk to stakeholders and can also 
lead to ineffective risk management, as many of the definitions lack legitimate scientific support 
(Aven, 2011b).  
As stated by Aven (2011b), despite the need for customised risk methods, procedures and 
models, there is no justification for having different perspectives on how to think regarding risk 
and uncertainty. The challenge remains the same, which is to conceptualise that the future 
performance of a system or an activity could lead to outcomes different from those desired and 
planned, or not in line with stated objectives (Aven, 2011b, p. 1).  
There have been many variations of the risk concept over the years. One of the most common 
conceptualisations of risk in use today is the (C,P) perspective, where C is the consequences and 
P refers to the related probabilities of the consequences. This conceptualisation is often used in 
ERM and the risk is usually characterised by risk matrices. The perspective on risk where 
probability is one of the main dimensions can be challenged by the fact that probability is an 
imperfect tool and can produce inadequate predictions. This perspective does not acknowledge 
that the probabilities are conditioned on several assumptions and beliefs. Uncertainties can be 
hidden in this background knowledge, and by limiting awareness to just the probabilities can 
conceal crucial factors that could produce surprising outcomes (Aven, 2010). 
For a comprehensive historical coverage the reader is pointed to the work by Aven (2014). The 
perspective taken in this report is based on Aven’s recommendations. It is stated in (Aven, 
2017) that a general perspective like what the author advocates captures most of the common 
definitions of risk and is also in accordance with the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA, 2015). 





Consider an activity, e.g., investing in a new start-up company, opening a new online store or 
travelling to a new location. These activities lead to unknown consequences (C). At present time 
it cannot be established what the consequences will be – they are uncertain (U). The risk 
concept advocated by Aven (2017) consists of these two main features: consequences C in 
relation to the values of interest and the related uncertainties (U). The definition outlined does 
not differentiate between positive and negative consequences, which leads to a more objective 
approach to risk. This is because categorising the consequences as either positive or negative 
would introduce the opinion of the assessor, and that could be problematic since what is 
considered an undesirable outcome for one stakeholder, does not necessarily mean that this 
view is shared by the others.  
Adopting the two-dimensional (C,U) perspective (also called the general risk approach) allows 
for any type of uncertainty representation, which means it can work as a unified perspective on 
uncertainties in a risk assessment context (Aven, 2014, p. 34). The perspective supports 
concepts like surprises and black swans (surprising extreme event relative to the present 
knowledge/beliefs (Aven, 2013, p. 6)) and is also consistent with the belief that decision-
making under risk and uncertainties should be risk-informed, not risk-based. The (C,U) 
perspective distinguish the concept of risk and how it is measured or described, which should 
encourage an approach that is more humble in the search of what risk entails (Aven, 2014, p. 
38).  
The consequences are often divided into events A and consequences C. Risk is then written as 
(A,C,U) (Aven, 2015, p. 13). The risk concept is now defined. However, this concept is not 
used as a tool for assessing risk. To measure or describe risk, a risk characterisation, or 
description, must be established. 
2.2 Risk characterisation 
Having provided the risk concept, the recommended framework for describing risk can now be 
specified. Risk characterisation, or risk description, is defined in SRA (2015) as a qualitative 
and/or quantitative picture of the risk; i.e., a structured statement of risk usually containing the 
elements:  
 risk sources 
 causes  
 events  
 consequences  
 uncertainty representations/measurements (for example probability distributions for 
different categories of consequences – casualties, environmental damage, economic loss 
etc.)  




As defined in the Section 2.1, risk has two dimensions, consequences and uncertainties. The risk 
description is realised by specifying the consequences and using a description, or measure, of 
the uncertainty, Q. There are various ways to measure uncertainty (Aven, 2014, p. 69), such as:  
The statistical approach that uses frequentist probabilities (the frequentist probability of an 
event A is interpreted as the fraction of times A occurs if the experiment could be repeated 
infinitely many times under similar conditions (Aven, 2017)).  
The Bayesian approach, where uncertainty is represented by subjective probabilities 
(judgemental or knowledge-based probabilities, characterised by an individual’s personal 
degree of belief whether a specific outcome is likely to occur (Oredsson, 2017, p. 4) or using 
frequentist probabilities (referred to as chances in this setting) which are parameters of 
probability models that support the assignment process of subjective probabilities. 
General risk approach, here any representation (measure) of uncertainty Q, for example 
probability P or imprecise probabilities. 
Specifying the consequences entails identification of quantities of interest C’, which 
characterise the consequences C. The value of the C’ is of interest in the risk analysis because 
they give information regarding the performance of the alternatives that are considered. The 
quantities C’ are predicted in the risk analysis, and the uncertainties are assessed. The general 
description of risk can now be obtained (Aven, 2015, p. 14): 
Risk description = (A’C’,Q,K), where 
A’ is some specified events and K is the background knowledge that Q and C’ are based on.  
This framework recognises that risk is more than just probabilities and expected values. The 
uncertainty dimension extends beyond the probabilities and the framework assists in providing 
crucial input for making judgements regarding the quality of risk assessments (Aven, 2011b, p. 
9). 
2.3 Risk matrices 
Risk matrices are widely used to characterise risk in enterprise risk management frameworks 
and is also used to characterise information risks in the methodology used as a case study for 
this report. This section will therefore give a brief introduction to the risk matrix.  
A risk matrix is a table with categories for impact or consequence on the x-axis, and categories 
for likelihood or probability on the y-axis. The intersection between each category on the x-axis 
and each category on the y-axis signifies a risk level (Cox, 2008) and is often colour coded to 
signify the magnitude of risk. Usually, the consequences are related to negative outcomes such 
as monetary losses or fatalities. As can be seen from Table 1, the resultant risk of the 
consequence-probability pair (<$10M,<5% per year) is in the green colour category, which 














year         
20%-50% per 
year         
5%-20% per 
year         
<5% per year         





  Consequence (financial loss) 
Table 1 - Example risk matrix 
Risk matrices are commonly used by organisations as a decision-support tool in risk 
management (Flage & Røed, 2012), and is also a prevalent tool for presenting the risk picture in 
enterprise risk management frameworks. Some of the main advantages of the risk matrix is that 
it is intuitive, easy to understand and does not require any formal education to make use of it. 
However, the idea that the matrix can satisfactorily capture the full risk picture with two 
dimensions – consequence and probability – has been challenged (e.g. (Aven, 2017)) partly 
because it does not reflect the knowledge dimension. Despite receiving criticism over the years 
(e.g. (Cox, 2008), (Flage & Røed, 2012)), the risk matrix is still widely used to describe risk.  
2.4 Information risk in the context of enterprise risk management 
The purpose of this section is to give an overview and to establish the context for information 
risks.  
Risk management relates to all activities, conditions and events that can affect the organisation 
and its ability to reach the organisation’s goals and vision (Aven, 2015, p. 4). Risk management 
specifically in enterprises is a relatively new field of risk (D’Arcy & Brogan, 2001) and there 
are, albeit similar, several definitions on what enterprise risk management entails. The ERM 
definition adopted here is the Casualty Actuarial Society Enterprise Risk Management 




“ERM is the discipline by which an organization in any industry assesses, controls, exploits, 
finances, and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose of increasing the organization’s 
short- and long-term value to its stakeholders.” 
There are many benefits associated with the implementation of an ERM-framework. It can 
increase opportunities, identify risks throughout the company, and increase the company’s 
profit while reducing negative consequences. Risk management in enterprises is commonly 
divided into risk categories such as organisational risk, financial risk, strategic risk and 
compliance risk (Information Security Forum, 2017, p. 5). Although the categories can vary to 
some degree, the primary point is that enterprise risk management considers all types of risk an 
organisation faces (D’Arcy & Brogan, 2001, p. 4).  
A traditional conceptualisation of risk in risk management models is the (C,P) perspective, 
where C is the consequences and P refers to the related probabilities of the consequences. At the 
corporate level, the standard approach for describing risks in most risk management models is 
using risk matrices. Individual risks are assessed in terms of risk level, which is a function of 
the consequences of an event and the likelihood (probability/frequency). When presenting the 
total risk picture for the organisation, the idea is to compare risks from all departments, e.g. 
combining quantitative assessments in finance with quantitative risk assessments regarding 
production, to support decision making at the corporate level.  
 
 
Figure 1 - ERM hierarchy 
Operational risk is risk where the consequences for the enterprise are a result of safety- or 
security-related issues such as accidental events and intentional acts (Aven, 2015, p. 5). Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) defines operational risk as: 
“The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems 




An overview of the ERM hierarchy with a focus on the sub-domain of information risk is shown 
in Figure 1. For the purpose of this report it is of interest to investigate information risk, which 




3 Information security risk management 
The main goal of information security is to ensure business continuity and minimise business 
damage by preventing and minimising the impact of security incidents (von Solms, 1998, p. 
224). To achieve this goal, there must be a functioning risk management process in place. This 
entails having a systematic approach to information security risk management (ISRM) that 
identifies organisational needs in relation to information security requirements and to create an 
effective information security management system (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2011). 
Information security is defined by The International Organization for Standardization (2017) as: 
“preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information”. Preserving the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information can be critical for e.g. maintaining 
competitive advantage and cash flow. This means that there is a need to protect data and system 
assets that are essential for the business from those who could potentially misuse it. To 
understand how information risk is assessed, the concept of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability, and the three-factor approach will be presented.  
3.1 Confidentiality, integrity and availability 
A fundamental concept of information security is the CIA triad. CIA is an abbreviation for 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, where each of these attributes represent a fundamental 
objective of information security. These are defined by Andress (2014) as:  
 Confidentiality: Refers to the ability to protect data from those that are not authorised 
to view it.  
 Integrity: Refers to the protection against unauthorised creation, modification or 
destruction of information. 
 Availability: Refers to the ability to access the data when it is needed.  
By evaluating the elements in the CIA triad in relation to a specific asset in an organisation, the 
value of this specific asset can be assessed. As explained in the introduction to Section 3, the 
main goal of information security is to secure the business against threats and ensure success in 
daily operations by ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability. A method for evaluating 
the components of the CIA triad will be demonstrated in Section 3.4.2. 
3.2 Threat, asset and vulnerability 
Assessing risk in information security is usually done with the basis on the three factors threat, 
asset and vulnerability. This perspective on risk is often called the three-factor approach. Risk is 






Figure 2 - Three-factor approach 
To understand the relationship between these factors, they will first be defined in line with the 
ISO definitions (International Organization for Standardization, 2017): 
 Threat: “potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system 
or organization.” 
 Asset: “An asset is anything that has value to the organization and which therefore 
requires protection.” 
 Vulnerability: “weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited by one or more 
threats.” 
In essence, a threat is what the organisation wants to protect against, and the asset is what the 
organisation wants to protect. A vulnerability can be thought of as a weakness or hole in the 
defence. According to this approach, risk level moves in relation to these three factors. As 
Figure 2 illustrates, the risk level is characterised as “high” if there is a threat with a high 
strength, the organisation has a highly valuable asset and there is a critical weakness in the 





3.3 Frameworks and standards for risk management and information security 
There are many different methods available for risk management and risk assessment of 
information security. The purpose of this section is to inform the reader of some of the available 
methods that are currently in use and are widely referred to in different industries.  
ISO 31000 – provides principles and generic guidelines on risk management. It is not specific to 
any industry or sector but is intended to contribute principles and general guidelines on how to 
undertake risk management at the corporate level. This standard is listed because it is a 
recognised standard that has strongly impacted the risk assessment and risk management field, 
and is the foundation for several methods, such as the IRAM2 information risk methodology and 
COSO enterprise risk management framework.  
ISO 27001 – provides requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continually 
improving an information security management system within the context of the organisation 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2013). Builds on the principles presented in 
ISO 31000.  
ISO 27005 –  provides guidelines for information security risk management. These guidelines 
are based on the more generic guidelines of ISO 31000. It supports the general concepts in ISO 
27001 on requirements for information security management systems, and is designed to assist 
the satisfactory implementation of information security based on a risk management approach. 
(Refsdal, Solhaug, & Stølen, 2015, p. 6). 
The FAIR approach – a flexible methodology for assessing information risks. One of the few 
methods that makes use of quantitative estimates regarding the probability of occurrence of 
threats.  
COSO ERM (2017) – defines essential enterprise risk management components, discusses 
important principles and concepts for ERM, and provides guidance on enterprise risk 
management (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 
2018).  
Information Risk Assessment Methodology 2 (IRAM2) (Information Security Forum, 2017) – 
recognised methodology designed to help organisations understand and manage their 
information risks. IRAM2 is based on a qualitative risk assessment approach. It has been 
decided to use the methodology as a case study for this report, as it is considered within the 
industry to be best practice despite having several weaknesses according to risk practitioner S. 





3.4 IRAM2 methodology 
Information Risk Assessment Methodology 2 (IRAM2) (Information Security Forum, 2017) 
attempts to combine traditional information risk assessments with enterprise risk management 
reporting. As explained in Section 3.2, information risks are often assessed in terms of threats, 
assets and vulnerabilities. This concept is also used in IRAM2 which is a recognised 
methodology designed to help organisations understand and manage their information risks. 
Figure 3 illustrates that the input in IRAM2 has basis on the three-factor approach that was 
introduced in Section 3.2. 
 
Figure 3 – IRAM2 assesses information risk 
In accordance with IRAM2, each threat is assessed using an information risk equation that 
outputs the corresponding residual risk. Figure 4 shows the key components that form each 
information risk equation. For every threat established throughout the process there is one 
information risk equation. This figure is based specifically on adversarial threats, but the 
process for other threat categories, such as accidental and environmental, follow the same 
procedure. The only difference lies in which threat attributes are used to derive the likelihood of 





Figure 4 - Flowchart IRAM2 methodology 
Dotted squares in Figure 4 indicates that risk matrices attached to IRAM2 must be used to derive 
the resultant of the respective components.  
The process of assessing risk within IRAM2 is done through several phases. The colour in the 
squares corresponds to the associated phase where the component is derived. More than one 
colour within a square indicates that the component is derived from more than one phase. The 
phase and colour combinations, which correspond to IRAM2, are as follows: 
 Phase B: Green  
 Phase C: Orange  
 Phase D: Red  
 Phase E: Purple. 
The information in this section is based on IRAM2 unless otherwise stated. The methodology 
will be presented with a walk-through from Phase A: Scoping to Phase E: Risk Evaluation. The 
methodology is applied to a case study to aid the reader in understanding each step in the 
process. The case will be to assess the risk regarding the author’s master thesis.   
The last phase in IRAM2, Phase: F: Risk Treatment is not included. Risk treatment is about 
planning, implementing, and managing appropriate countermeasures, which is outside the scope 
of this report. 
3.4.1 Phase A: Scoping 
The goal of this phase is to develop a profile of the environment and establish the scope for the 




Chromecast, and smart TV. The scope for this analysis will be the master thesis which can be 
accessed from the laptop.  
3.4.2 Phase B: Business Impact Assessment 
This phase begins with the identification of information assets and assessment of the business 
impact. In IRAM2, information assets are defined as:  
“Information assets are information (either physical or logical) that have value to an 
organisation.” 
Relevant information assets will be assets such as the master thesis, private documents, and 
confidential documents from past projects. In this case, the object of analysis has already been 
established in Phase A, which is the master thesis. 
Once this has been decided, the next step involves assessment of common types of business 
impacts that the author could encounter because of the loss of one, or more, of the information 
attributes confidentiality, integrity and availability. These attributes are defined as: 
 Confidentiality: the information is accessible only to authorised individuals 
 Integrity: the information is accurate (i.e. uncorrupted and unaltered) 
 Availability: the information is accessible and usable when required 
IRAM2 recommends each organisation to create their own customised Business Impact 
Reference Table (BIRT), to best reflect the relevant impact categories and aid the practitioner in 
determining the impact rating for each category. The scoring levels are negligible (0), low (1), 
moderate (2) and high (3). Table 2 is an example BIRT for the current case.  
 
Impact rating 
Impact category Negligible Low Moderate High 
Financial Small loss of <5k 
NOK 







Reputational Negligible impact 
on reputation 


























When assessing business impact in this phase it is the inherent impact, i.e. the potential impact 
before mitigating controls that are considered. In IRAM2, both realistic and worst-case inherent 
business impact is considered by asking two questions respectively: “What is the most 
reasonable inherent impact?” and “What is the plausible worst-case inherent impact?” 
Some key assumptions related to each information attribute must be agreed on, and then 
realistic and worst-case inherent impact ratings can begin. Table 3 is an example of impact 
scenario assumptions specifically for this case. 
 
Information attribute Assumption type Descriptions 
Confidentiality Sensitivity Data can be sensitive and contain confidential 
information from PwC.  
  Volume How many files have been disclosed, in both the realistic 
and worst-case scenarios? Realistic: 1-2 files, worst-case: 
10 files. 
Integrity Source of truth The master thesis file is the original file, but with some 
older versions available elsewhere. Loss of integrity 
could lead to days or weeks of set-back. 
  Volume 
 
  Decision making Not applicable 
Availability Timeline Realistic duration of the asset being unavailable: 1 day. 
Worst-case: 1 week. 
Table 3 - Impact scenario assumptions 
The information attributes must be assessed for each applicable impact category in the BIRT. 
IRAM2 suggests recording the outcomes in a business impact assessment template as in Table 4. 
Only financial and reputational impacts are assessed in this example. In reality, all relevant 






Information asset Confidentiality Integrity Availability 































Worst-case: Low  
 
Table 4 - Business impact assessment template 
3.4.3 Phase C: Threat Profiling 
This phase starts with the identification and prioritisation of relevant threats to the environment. 
IRAM2 defines a threat as: 
“A threat is anything that is capable, by its action or inaction, of causing harm to an 
information asset.” 
IRAM2 groups threats by specific threat attributes, which will help the practitioner in 
understanding the nature of the threat. The threat attribute “intent” is the first grouping usually 
performed, which results in three groups:  
1. Adversarial: threats that perform deliberate actions against the organisation’s 
information systems or assets, with the goal of causing harm. 
2. Accidental: threats that are a result of error or unintentional action that cause harm to the 
organisation’s information systems or assets. 
3. Environmental: threats that are outside the control of the organisation that cause harm to 
the information systems or assets (e.g. natural hazards). 
The first step is to create a threat landscape for the organisation, which is done by identifying 
the relevant threats and listing them in a common threat list (CTL). IRAM2 provides the 
practitioner with a pre-populated list of typical threats that are already grouped into adversarial, 
accidental and environmental. Table 5 is a common threat list created for this case. For the sake 





Adversarial   Accidental   Environmental   
Threat Origin Threat Origin Threat Origin 
Hacking group External Customer  External Earthquake External 
Individual hacker External Employee Internal Fire Internal/External 
Competitor External … … … … 
Nation state External .. .. … … 
Terrorist group External . . .. .. 
… …     . . 
Table 5 - Common threat list (CTL) 
Once this is completed, the next step involves profiling each threat. This is done by assessing 
each threat attribute associated with the corresponding threat, e.g. threat attributes history, 
motivation, capability and commitment are assessed for the adversarial group. This assessment 
is done by rating each threat attribute from negligible (0), to low (1), moderate (2), or high (3). 
The goal is to be able to calculate two key risk factors: Likelihood of initiation (LoI) and Threat 
strength (TS).  
LoI is defined as:  
“The likelihood that a particular threat will initiate one or more threat events against the 
environment being assessed” 
TS is defined as:  
“How effectively a particular threat can initiate and/or execute threat events against the 
environment being assessed.”  
Each organisation should customise their own threat profiling reference tables (TPRT) to 
provide guidance in this process. Table 6 is an example of such a table that is reproduced from 






  Rating 
Threat 
attribute 
Negligible (0) Low (1) Moderate (2) High (3) 
History The threat is not known 
to have initiated any 




relating to the 
environment over the 
last 12 months. 
The threat is known to 
have initiated a low 
number of (often 




relating to the 
environment the last 
12 months. 
The threat is known to 
have initiated multiple 




relating to the 
environment the last 
12 months. 
The threat is known to 
have initiated multiple 
and varied threat events 
(e.g. reconnaissance, 
physical attack, gaining 
unauthorised access and 
theft of information) 
relating to the 
environment over the 
last 12 months. 
Motivation -The threat is not 
expected to initiate a 
threat event against 
the environment. 
-The environment is 
considered to have 
limited to no value to 
the threat because the 
organisation does not 
align with any known 
motivation for the 
threat. 
-The threat is unlikely 
to initiate a threat 
event against the 
environment.  
-The environment is 
of minimal value to 
the threat because 
the organisation is 
likely not to align with 
a known motivation 
for the threat. 
-The threat is likely to 
initiate a threat event 
against the 
environment.  
-The environment is of 
moderate value to the 
threat, because the 
organisation aligns 
with known 
motivations for the 
threat. 
-The threat is highly 
motivated to initiate a 
threat event against the 
environment. 
-The environment is of 
significantly high value to 
the threat, because it 
closely aligns with more 
than one known 
motivations for the 
threat.  
Capability The threat is 
characterised as: 




-receiving no external 
support (e.g. no 




-having no access to 
the environment. 
The threat is 
characterised as: 
-involving a low 
number of individuals 
-having a limited level 
of experience and skill 
-receiving limited 
external support 
-having limited access 
to the environment. 
The threat is 
characterised as: 
-involving many 
individuals (i.e. a small 
group) 
-having a significant 




-having a moderate 
(i.e. general) range of 
access to the 
environment. 
The threat is 
characterised as: 
-involving one or more 
large groups (often 
based in multiple 
locations) 
-having an extremely 
high level of experience 
and skill (i.e. experts) 
-receiving significant 
external support 
-having significant (i.e. 





Commitment The threat is not 
believed to be 
committing any 
significant resources to 




interaction with the 
organisation or 
environment being 
assessed would be 
considered an 
opportunity (e.g. 
visiting a compromised 
website or activation of 
malware). 
The threat is believed 
to be committing a 
small amount of 
resources to initiating 
threat events against 
the environment 
being assessed.  
Example: level of 
commitment may be 
where a threat 
expends 
approximately 25% of 
its effort and/or 
computing/network 
resources initiating 
threat events, over a 
limited period (e.g. 
from days to weeks). 
The threat is believed 
to be expending a 
moderate amount of 
resources to initiating 
threat events against 
the environment being 
assessed.  
Example: level of 
commitment might be 
where the threat 
expends at least 50% 
of its effort and/or 
computing/network 
resources initiating 
threat events against 
the organisation's 
infor. systems being 
assessed, for a 
significant period (e.g. 
from weeks to 
months). 
The threat is believed to 
be expending most, if 
not all, resources to 
initiating threat events 
against the environment 
being assessed. Example: 
level of commitment 
might be where the 
threat is willing to 
initiate and sustain an 
advanced persistent 
threat (APT) against a 
target. This would 
require a significant level 
of effort (i.e. close to 
100% of their activities 
and/or 
computing/network 
capacity) over a long 
period of time (e.g. from 
months to years). 
Table 6 - Threat Profiling Reference Table (TPRT) 
When all relevant threat attributes associated with a specific threat have been assessed, it is 
recommended to record the results in a threat profiling template. Table 7 shows how this can be 
presented for the threats “hacker group” in the first row, and “individual hacker” in the second 
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Low (1) The threat is 
believed to be 
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this level of 
commitment 
may be where 
a threat 
expends 
approx. 25% of 
its effort. 
Table 7 - Threat profiling template 
This must be done for every threat within the threat landscape. Once this has been carried out, 




summing the scores from the history rating and motivation rating. TS is derived by summing the 
scores from the capability rating and the commitment rating. The resulting LoI and TS for the 
threats “hacking group” and “individual hacker” become, respectively: 
𝐿𝑜𝐼 = 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 (0) + 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) 
𝑇𝑆 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) + 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 (0) = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) 
and 
𝐿𝑜𝐼 = 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) + 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (2) 
𝑇𝑆 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 (0) + 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) = 𝐿𝑜𝑤 (1) 
IRAM2 provides risk factor scoring and reference tables where the practitioner can determine 
the different scores.  
When all the threats are profiled, a prioritised threat landscape should be created. According to 
IRAM2, this can be sorted by either listing the highest LoI score first, or TS score. Table 8 is an 
example of a prioritised threat landscape with the actual scores from the two highlighted rows 
and some hypothetical scores greyed out to show the setup.  






Terrorist group Adversarial External Moderate (4) High (5) 1 
Individual hacker Adversarial External Low (2) Low (1) 2 
Hacking group Adversarial External Low (1) Low (1) 3 
Fire Environmental Internal Low (0) Low (0) 4 
Nation state Adversarial External Low (0) Low (0) 5 
… … … … … 6 
.. .. .. .. .. 7 
Table 8 - Prioritised threat landscape 
The next step is to figure out which threat event is associated to each threat. IRAM2 makes it 
clear that the process of finding threat events and determining if they should be in scope is a 
subjective process that relies on the knowledge of the persons involved. The methodology 
comes with a Threat Event Catalogue (TEC) which lists threat events that threats in each threat 




 Origin (i.e. internal or external); “some threat events can only be executed by 
organisational insiders such as employees with physical and logical access to 
organisational information systems”.  
 Threat strength; “certain threat events require more capability (Adversarial threat events) 
or privilege (Accidental threat events) to effectively initiate (e.g. creating and utilising 
zero-day malware or executing an unintentional change in a production environment). 
This is defined as ‘minimum threat strength required to initiate threat event’ in the 
TEC.” 
Mapping threat events to each threat is done by working through the prioritised threat landscape 
from the highest priority rating to the lowest. The highest threat priority rating in this case 
comes from the threat “individual hacker”, which belongs to the threat group adversarial, where 
origin is external, and has a threat strength of low. Using the TEC, the practitioner looks for 
each threat event that meets these requirements. Table 9 is an excerpt of the TEC with some 
highlighted threat events to show that these fulfil the initiation requirements and can thus be 




Threat event Threat 
group 
Origin Min. threat 
strength 
ADV005 Conduct a DoS attack Adversarial External Moderate 
ADV007 Introduce malware to information 
system 
Adversarial External Low 
ADV014 Theft of information system 
hardware 
Adversarial Internal Low 
ADV016 Unauthorised network scanning Adversarial External Negligible 
Table 9 - Threat event catalogue (TEC) (excerpt) 
Once a threat event has been mapped to a specific threat in the prioritised threat landscape, there 
is no need to check if the same threat event can be mapped to lower rated threats in the 
prioritised threat landscape.  
The last step in this phase is to decide which information asset each threat event could impact. 
However, IRAM2 suggests first to identify which process or technology component(s) could be 
impacted by the threat event, and then determine which information assets that are related to 
those components. The last activity in this step is to determine the highest realistic and worst-
case inherent business impact rating for each component. This forms the basis for each 
information risk equation. Since the scope of this case is on one specific information asset, all 




example, but this should be done for each unique combination of threat, threat event, and 
impacted information asset.  
 
    Highest assessed realistic and worst-case inherent business impact rating 
Threat Threat 
event 

















Laptop Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Table 10 - Determining the basis for each information risk equation 
3.4.4 Phase D: Vulnerability Assessment 
Phase D consists of assessing how vulnerable the information assets are to each in-scope threat 
event. This step involves:  
 Choosing controls that are relevant to the environment being assessed. A control is 
defined as a measure that is modifying risk (ISO (2017)).   
 Mapping the controls to in-scope threat events and decide on their relevance 
 Assess the implementation of controls 
 Determine control strength for each combination of threat event and component.   
Every organisation should have a control library, which is an overview of an organisation’s 
controls, that provides support to the management of information security. In IRAM2, several 
potential sources to such control libraries are listed:  
 The ISF Standard of Good Practice for Information Security 
 ISO/IEC 27002:2013 
 NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
 Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) 
In IRAM2, a vulnerability is defined as: 
“A vulnerability is a weakness in people, process or technology in an environment, which 
could be exploited by one or more threats.” 
Vulnerability and threat strength are used to estimate the likelihood that a threat event is 
successful. This is called the Likelihood of Success (LoS).  




 Relevance: “The extent to which a control can reduce the likelihood and/or impact from 
a threat event.” 
 Implementation: “The extent to which a control is implemented within the environment 
being assessed.” 
Controls that are applicable for the environment being assessed in this case can be e.g.:  
 Control 1: Firewall firmware should be updated regularly. 
 Control 2: Antivirus software should be installed on laptop. 
 Control 3: Dropbox password should be considered strong.  
The next step is to rate the relevance of these controls to the threat events, by the aid of a 
scoring system as shown in Table 11: 
Score Means Extent of relevance Guidance 
4 Extent to which a 
control can reduce the 
likelihood and/or 
impact of a threat 
event 
Fully relevant The control can reduce the likelihood and/or 
impact of a threat event in 96-100% of cases 
3 Mostly relevant The control can reduce the likelihood and/or 
impact of a threat event in 66-95% of cases 
2 Moderately relevant The control can reduce the likelihood and/or 
impact of a threat event in 36-65% of cases 
1 Partially relevant The control can reduce the likelihood and/or 
impact of a threat event in 6-35% of cases 
0 Not relevant The control can reduce the likelihood and/or 
impact of a threat event in 0-5% of cases 












This should then be recorded in a control relevance table, see Table 12: 
 
  Threat event: ADV007 ADV016 
Control 
number 




1 Firewall firmware should be 
updated regularly 
4 4 
2 Antivirus software should be 
installed on laptop 
3 2 
3 Dropbox password should be 
considered strong 
0 0 
Table 12 - Control relevance table 
Next, the practitioner is to assess the control implementation in the environment. In IRAM2, the 
scoring system used for this step is as shown in Table 13.  
 
Score Means   Guidance 
4 Extent to which a control is implemented In all cases (or "Yes") 96-100% 
3 In most cases 66-95% 
2 In about half the cases 36-65% 
1 In a few cases 6-35% 
0 Not implemented In no cases (or "No") 0-5% 





This should be recorded in a control implementation assessment table, see Table 14: 








Firewall should be 
updated regularly 
0 The firewall has never been 
updated, at least manually 
N/A 
Antivirus software 
should be installed on 
laptop 




should be considered 
strong 
4 Password is 30 ch. with 181 bits 
quality 
N/A 
Table 14 - Control implementation assessment 
The last step is to calculate the control strength (CS) score for each combination of threat event 
and component by using the following formula: 





𝑟 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑗 
𝑖 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑗 
In this case,  




𝑟 𝑖 + 𝑟 𝑖 + 𝑟 𝑖
𝑟 + 𝑟 + 𝑟
=
4 ∗ 0 + 3 ∗ 3 + 0 ∗ 4
4 + 3 + 0
≅ 1,3 
This is a dimensionless quantity. Using the risk factor scoring and reference tables provided in 
IRAM2 in Appendix H, the control strength score 1,3 can be found in the interval for control 
rating equal to “Low”.  
3.4.5 Phase E: Risk Evaluation 
The risk evaluation phase consists of evaluating the remaining risk factors (likelihood of 
success, residual likelihood, and residual business impact rating) and derivation of the residual 
risk rating for each risk. These risks are determined using matrices provided in Appendix H: 




As preparation for this phase, it is recommended to create a table showing all threats with the 
corresponding risk factors determined in earlier phases. This forms the setup for the information 








































































































Table 15 - Recorded information risk equation 
IRAM2 defines likelihood of success (LoS) as: 
“The likelihood that the strength of a threat will be sufficient to overwhelm the strength of 
controls in place (or planned), resulting in a successful threat event” 
The LoS matrix, see Table 16, gives LoS = Low (since threat strength is low and control 





  Threat strength 
  Negligible Low Moderate High 
Control 
strength 
High Negligible Negligible Low Moderate 
Moderate Negligible Low Moderate High 
Low Low Low High High 
Negligible Low Moderate High High 
Table 16 - Likelihood of success (LoS) matrix 
This must be derived for all relevant threats and associated threat event and component 
combinations that were derived in earlier phases.  
Next, the practitioner should derive the residual likelihood for each threat by using the residual 
likelihood matrix, see table Table 17: 
  Likelihood of success 




High Moderate Moderate High High 
Moderate Low Moderate Moderate High 
Low Low Low Moderate Moderate 
Negligible Negligible Low Low Low 
Table 17 - Residual likelihood matrix 
From the previous step, likelihood of success is low. Likelihood of initiation, found in Table 15, 
is low. The resulting residual likelihood is then derived to be low.  
The next step is to determine the residual business impact rating, which is defined as: 
“The residual business impact rating is the business impact rating after the relevant (i.e. 
realistic or worst-case) impact scenario have been determined, and the effect of controls in 
place (or planned) has been assessed.”  
This rating is found by first selecting a suitable inherent impact scenario for each risk, i.e. either 
realistic or worst-case. The recommended default starting point is to start with the realistic 
inherent impact scenario, which in this case is moderate (see Table 15). Deciding which is 
suitable (realistic or worst-case) demands knowledge regarding threat strength and control 
strength ratings. In this case both threat strength and control strength are low. Based on this it is 




step is to consider if any of the relevant controls aid in the reduction of inherent impact ratings 
for confidentiality, integrity and availability. Lastly, overall residual impact rating must be set 
for each risk to the highest of the residual impact ratings.  
Next step is to derive the residual risk rating. This is done by using a residual risk rating matrix, 
see Table 18: 
  Residual impact 
  Negligible Low Moderate High 
Residual 
likelihood 
High Moderate Moderate High High 
Moderate Low Moderate Moderate High 
Low Low Low Moderate Moderate 
Negligible Negligible Low Low Low 
Table 18 - Residual risk rating matrix 
The residual risk rating for the case applied, with residual likelihood being rated low and 
residual impact rated moderate, result in a residual risk rating of moderate for this specific risk.  
When the residual risk rating for all the risks in the environment have been assessed, the risks 
can be inserted into a prioritised residual risk profile, which completes Phase E. The final phase, 
which is scoped out of this report, involves determining the appropriate risk treatment for each 





4 Evaluation of IRAM2 
Evaluation of IRAM2 will be partly based on the generic guidelines on risk management 
provided in ISO 31000 (International Organization for Standardization, 2018). This is a 
recognised standard that has strongly impacted the risk assessment and risk management field. 
The standard has received criticism (e.g. (Aven, 2011c)) for aspects such as being unclear on 
fundamental concepts, risk and probabilities. However, there is still broad agreement that the 
standard builds on good principles and follows a logical process. It is on these points the 
methodology will be evaluated.  
Furthermore, there are other aspects of the methodology that will be discussed (e.g. risk 
conceptualisations, calculation methods, use of matrices and background knowledge). These 
aspects will be discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.3, and will be based on existing scientific 
literature on risk and guideline documents (e.g. (SRA, 2015)).  
The structure of this section follows a top-down approach covering the conceptual level of 
IRAM2 first, and then discussing the principles and the process. Following this, the methods 
used in the methodology will be discussed.  
4.1 Concepts 
IRAM2 is built on several concepts, and many are well-defined, precise and unambiguous. A 
few of the concepts, however, are debatable and some of them are argued in scientific literature 
to be unsuccessful in producing consistent and meaningful definitions (Aven, 2011c). The latter 
relates to key generic concepts within the field of risk analysis and how they are defined 
according to the guidelines recommended by the Society for Risk Analysis (2015).  
This section does not contain an exhaustive list of all the concepts used in IRAM2 but will 
review some of them to demonstrate the varying degree of concept quality. The structure of this 
section follows a “best to worst” structure.  
Information assets and threats 
The two concepts of information assets and threats are examples of well-defined, precise and 
unambiguous concepts in IRAM2.  
Information assets is defined as: 
“Information assets are information (either physical or logical) that have value to an 
organisation” 
A threat is defined as: 





The definition of a threat is also listed with a warning commenting on the misuse of this concept 
in general, and to alert the practitioner on paying attention to how it is defined in IRAM2.  
Realistic and worst-case business impact 
Realistic business impact and worst-case business impact are defined, respectively, as:  
“The business impact that is expected to occur in a typical scenario” 
“The business impact that could occur in an extreme (i.e. very rare) scenario”  
These concepts can be argued to not be well-defined and precise. Evidently, by making the risk 
practitioner distinguish between the most likely scenario and a very rare scenario will contribute 
to – at least to some extent – a more precise risk assessment. Yet, it is not clear what a “typical” 
or “very rare” scenario imply. To make this distinction between realistic and worst-case 
scenarios more useful, the differences should be more precise. However, in the state the 
definitions are now, there is some usability.  
Vulnerability 
As stated by Aven (2015, p. 19), the concept of vulnerability is closely related to risk, and 
essentially it means risk conditional on the occurrence of an event. A vulnerability is defined in 
IRAM2 as:  
“A weakness in people, process or technology in an environment, which could be exploited 
by one or more threats.” 
Now, consider one of the overall qualitative definitions of vulnerability in the SRA glossary 
(2015): 
“The degree a system is affected by a risk source or agent” 
SRA considers vulnerability as “the degree” of something, while IRAM2 refers to “a weakness”. 
However, a vulnerability in IRAM2 is interpreted similarly as a vulnerability in (SRA, 2015). 
The vulnerability concept in the methodology is used to determine the likelihood of a threat 
event being successful, and as such, vulnerability is used as a measure for how vulnerable a 
system is.  
Uncertainty 
Risk analysts addressing uncertainty in risk assessments regarding non-intentional acts (e.g. 
natural disasters, equipment failure on an offshore platform, etc.) are generally well versed in 
their methods, although that is not always apparent. However, considering uncertainty when 
there is an intelligent adversary adds a different layer of uncertainty – the behaviour of the 
adversary (S. Guikema, 2012). 
In IRAM2 (2017, p. 3), the reader is presented with risk fundamentals. After risk is defined (see 




“Risk is often expressed as a combination of two key determinants: the likelihood of a 
certain event occurring (an expression of the `uncertainty` in the definition above) and the 
impact such an event would have on the achievement of one or more objectives.” 
“...the definition above” is referring to the ISO definition of risk (see Risk in this section). This 
statement suggests that the methodology considers only uncertainty related to the likelihood of 
the event, but not uncertainty tied to the impact. This does not exactly match ISO Guide 
73:2009 definition of uncertainty: 
“Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information related to, understanding 
or knowledge of, an event, its consequence, or likelihood.”  
It is not stated explicitly that IRAM2 is using ISO’s definition for uncertainty, but it should be 
consistency in the concepts that the methodology forms its foundation on.  
Likelihood/probability 
ISF (2017) defines likelihood as: 
“Likelihood is the chance that a threat will initiate a successful threat event within a defined 
period of time.” 
This resembles ISO’s definition of likelihood:  
“Chance of something happening” 
However, like ISO, ISF does not define what a chance is. Aven argues (Aven, 2011c) that there 
is a need for a broad interpretation that clearly defines all concepts introduced if it is to be used 
in a professional risk management context.  
Risk 
IRAM2 has adopted the ISO Guide 73:2009 definition of risk. The risk management 
terminology of ISO has been discussed in (Aven, 2011c) where several weaknesses of the 
terminology is highlighted. One of them has to do with the definition of risk: “Risk is the effect 
of uncertainty on objectives”, where “effect is a deviation from the expected. It can be positive, 
negative or both, and can address, create or result in opportunities and threats.” (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2018, p. 1). Aven argues that this definition is not precise 
enough and can lead to different interpretations depending on who the reader is. The author 
presents an example to show its ambiguity (Aven, 2011c, p. 2). Here, the example is reproduced 
with some adjustments applied to information risk to illustrate the point: 
The outcome of an activity is either 0 or 1, where 0 refers to no power failure of server. 1 refers 
to power failure of server. The probabilities are, respectively, 0.1 and 0.9. The expected 
outcome, E(outcome) = 0.1*0+0.9*1 = 0.9. Deviation from the expected is either 0 or 1. The 




ISO, risk is the “effect of uncertainty”, i.e. an outcome 0 or 1, “on objectives”, i.e. outcome 0 
meets the objective although 1 does not.  
This can be hard to interpret. One way of interpreting this, according to the article, is that risk is 
the event that the objective is not met, i.e. risk is the event “power failure of server” (outcome 
1). The event is a deviation from the expected; it is subject to uncertainties and relates to the 
objectives (Aven, 2011c, p. 2). According to this, the situation with a power failure is the risk. 
This outcome is liable to uncertainties, but the risk concept confines to the event “power 
failure” – the uncertainties is a separate domain. These definitions lead to conceptual challenges 
and do not fit well for most purposes (Aven, 2011c, p. 2).  
However, as also pointed out in (Aven, 2011c), ISO’s definition of risk incorporates the 
uncertainty dimension rather than the probability dimension. As mentioned in Section 2.1, 
probability is only a tool for determining risk level and does not capture potentially important 
uncertainty aspects that are tied to the probabilities.  
4.2 Comparison with ISO 31000 
In this section, there will firstly be an evaluation of the principles in IRAM2. Following that is 
an evaluation of the process.  
4.2.1 Principles 
According to ISO 31000 (2018), the purpose of risk management is the creation and protection 
of value. It is stated that the principles provide guidance on the characteristics of effective and 
efficient risk management, communicating its value and explaining its intention and purpose. 
The standard lists eight principles, which are:  
a) integrated 




f) best available information 
g) human and cultural factors 
h) continual improvement 
The reader is pointed to the standard for further explanation on each principle. Each of the 
principles will now be evaluated up against IRAM2. 
Integrated  
The methodology encourages engagement with stakeholders and management. It emphasizes 
the need for participation from different stakeholders at various key stages during the process. 





Prior to implementing IRAM2, it is recommended to follow certain requirements listed (see 
(Information Security Forum, 2017, p. 12)). One of these requirements is to have an 
organisational risk management framework in place, which should help integrate the 
methodology into a broader risk management process within an organisation.  
The methodology encourages integration with organisational activities such as sharing the same 
business impact assessment tables as used for other parts of enterprise risk assessments. This 
should ensure better integration.  
Structured and comprehensive 
IRAM2 has a structured approach. Each phase starts with a precise overview of what the phase 
objectives are and the steps to get there. It also lists the key inputs and outputs for each specific 
phase.  
The methodology has a clear and, for the most part, logical flow for the various activities. 
However, the placement of Phase B: Business Impact Assessment is worth discussing. 
Assessment of business impact because of the loss of information attributes involves 
establishing the consequences of potential threats to the organisation. In IRAM2, this is done 
before the threats and threat events, i.e. the initiating events, are determined. The result of this is 
a limited analysis which concentrates on a select few events capable of influencing performance 
measures that are highlighted in the analysis (Aven, 2015, p. 34).  
According to Aven (2015), the backward approach demands less time investment. However, 
substantial experience and capability is required to make sure the analysis provides sufficient 
basis for decision-making. In IRAM2, the placement of the phase is justified by being a natural 
segue from Phase A: Scoping due to the involvement of the same stakeholders.  
It should be noted that a comment in the beginning of Phase B states that the practitioner can 
decide to assess likelihood of threats and impact components of the information risk equation in 
their preferred sequence.  
Customised 
It is encouraged in the methodology to customise the framework to each organisation. ISF 
(2017) advocates to customise a selection of tables used in the methodology, e.g. an approved;  
 Business impact reference table 
 Organisational threat landscape 
 Organisational threat profiling reference table 
 Organisational threat event catalogue 
 Control relevance table. 





The methodology clearly highlights which stakeholder(s) should participate in each phase. This 
ensures appropriate and timely involvement of stakeholders, which, in line with ISO (2018), 
enables their knowledge, views and perceptions to be considered.  
Dynamic 
The ever-increasing rate of digitalisation results in the emergence of information risks, attacks 
that increase in frequency and in level of sophistication (Oredsson, 2017). The principle of 
staying dynamic in such a landscape can be argued to be demanding and bordering 
unachievable. In an attempt to deal with this, however, ISF (2017) recommends the practitioner 
and key stakeholders to review risks on a regular basis, together with other potential 
contributing factors in the organisation. Considering new risks, nonetheless, is a tedious and 
time-consuming process in IRAM2.  
Best available information 
IRAM2 bases the risk equations on a selection of threat attributes that are rated using a semi-
quantitative scoring system. Weighing the history attribute in calculation of adversarial threats 
can be problematic. From the perspective of this report, best available information regarding 
input to risk assessmet is based on having criteria for the strength of knowledge that lies behind 
the probabilities, which are missing; there should be made changes in the assessment of 
likelihood of initiation; and subjective probabilities should be reflected.  
Human and cultural factors 
It is stated in ISO (2018) that human behaviour and culture heavily influence risk management. 
Implementation of this principle is essential for assessing threats within information security. 
This is because understanding human behaviour and culture will aid the risk practitioner in 
pinpointing e.g. motivation, capability and commitment of potential attackers. A common 
thread throughout IRAM2 is that the practitioner is instructed to customise for example the 
threat profiling reference table for the environment being assessed. 
Continual improvement 
The ISF recommends piloting the methodology within an organisation, which can help improve 
understanding through learning and experience. ISF also offers IRAM2 training and attendance 
at specific courses. Furthermore, ISF encourages the practitioner to provide feedback, both to 
ISF and to other members, which can be used to continually improve the methodology. 
4.2.2 Process 
The risk management process according to ISO (2018) involves systematic application of 




establishing context and assessing, treating, monitoring, reviewing, recording and reporting risk. 
This section will follow the process structure in IRAM2, rather than the process structure of 
ISO. This decision was made because one of the phases in IRAM2 is not as clear as to where it 
belongs in the ISO equivalent process.  
Phase A: Scoping 
In Phase A: Scoping of IRAM2 is the development of an environmental profile, which aids the 
risk practitioner in understanding the area to be assessed. Further, this phase includes defining 
and agreeing on the scope for the assessment. This complies with the scope, context, criteria 
phase in ISO (2018).  
Phase B: Business Impact Assessment 
Phase B: Business Impact Assessment is not as clear where it should be placed in the ISO 
equivalent process. This is because the Business Impact Assessment phase identifies 
information assets, which is a scoping process. In addition to this, the practitioner must also 
assess the business impact of suffering a loss of one or more of its information attributes 
(confidentiality, integrity, availability) during this phase. This is part of the risk assessment 
phase in ISO where consequences and their impact on objectives should be considered. It 
should be noted that IRAM2 lists a warning in this phase that the user should not consider cause 
of impact at this stage.  
Phase C: Threat Profiling 
Phase C: Threat Profiling is the equivalent to the risk identification step in ISO. According to 
ISO, the purpose of this step is to identify risks by finding, recognising and describing risks that 
help or prevent the organisation achieving its objectives. In IRAM2, the purpose of this phase is 
to identify and prioritise relevant threats and decide how they can manifest to cause harm to the 
environment. However, this phase also includes risk analysis. As stated in the ISO guidelines, 
the purpose of risk analysis is to comprehend the nature of risk and its characteristics.  
Phase D: Vulnerability Assessment 
Phase D: Vulnerability Assessment consists of identifying the amount to which the information 
assets are vulnerable to each in-scope threat event. This also fits in ISO’s risk identification and 
risk analysis steps.  
Phase E: Risk Evaluation 
Phase E: Risk Evaluation complies reasonably well with risk evaluation in ISO. In IRAM2, risk 
evaluation involves the evaluation of the risk factors (likelihood of success, residual likelihood, 
and residual business impact rating) and the derivation of the residual risk rating for each risk 
(Information Security Forum, 2017, p. 45). These risks are then prioritised in a residual risk 




ISO recommends comparing the results with established risk criteria to determine where 
additional action is required (International Organization for Standardization, 2018, p. 12). In 
IRAM2, during Phase F: Risk Treatment, there is a Section for determining whether any of the 
risks identified exceed the organisation’s risk appetite. Consider ISF’s definition of risk appetite 
(Information Security Forum, 2017, p. 53): 
“Risk appetite is the nature (i.e. risk category) and amount (i.e. risk rating) of risk that an 
organisation is willing to accept to achieve its objectives.” 
This has similarities to the ISO definition of risk criteria (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2018, p. 10):  
“The organization should specify the amount and type of risk that it may or may not take, 
relative to objectives.” 
This suggests that Phase E: Risk Evaluation does not cover all aspects of the risk evaluation step 
in ISO. It is not judged as a weakness of IRAM2 to evaluate risk criteria during Phase F rather 
than in Phase E, it is merely an acknowledgement of a different approach.  
Phase F: Risk Treatment 
Phase F: Risk Treatment is outside the scope of this report. See Phase E: Risk Evaluation for 
comments.  
4.3 Methods 
The order of the issues discussed in this section reflects the importance of them, from the 
author’s point of view.   
4.3.1 Calculation methods 
IRAM2 combines the traditional three-factor cyber risk approach with the two-factor approach 
commonly used in ERM. The basis of the information risk equation in the methodology is a 
function of likelihood and consequence. Looking at adversarial threats, which is the focus of 
this report, there are some points to discuss such as the use of the history attribute and the 
scoring system.  
In the information risk equation proposed by ISF (2017), residual likelihood decomposes to 
threat agent assessments and vulnerability assessments. The consequence dimension uses asset 
value assessments for scoping purposes and business impact estimates. Recall Figure 5, 





Figure 5 - Flowchart of IRAM2 
Further decomposition of the likelihood dimension (residual likelihood) shows that the history 
attribute is one of the main components for likelihood of initiation. The question can be raised if 
this attribute should play such a significant role in determining the likelihood of initiation. It can 
be argued that history does not necessarily have an impact on the likelihood of a future event, 
yet in IRAM2, this attribute is summed with the motivation attribute to give a total score for the 
likelihood of initiation. Most will agree that the history regarding an event can be an important 
source of information to determine future risk. This claim is not disputed. As Aven (2011a) 
points out, historical data provide insights into risk. If it is presumed that the future will be as 
history shows, good predictions regarding the future could be obtained. However, incorporating 
history as one of the main components to determine the risk of adversarial threats is 
problematic. The ramification of this will be discussed below. 
The rating system in IRAM2 is based on qualitative judgements that determine the risk factor 
score for each threat. Each of the threat attributes are assigned a rating of negligible, low, 
moderate or high, where each rating has a score from 0-3, respectively. The risk factor 
“Likelihood of initiation” consists of the threat attributes history and motivation, and the scores 
of these are added to generate the score of likelihood of initiation. Summing the attributes seems 
arbitrary and can be argued does not give a justified picture of the likelihood of an initiating 
event. An example will illustrate this:  
If a threat actor emerges with a high motivation for an attack, but no relevant history from this 
actor exists, the likelihood of initiation can never reach a score higher than a three out of a total 
score of six. Restriction on getting a higher score just because there is no history, is hard to 




a given threat based on just motivation, despite no existing history (known to the assessor) of 
such a threat actor. This is especially relevant in the world of an ever-evolving cyber risk 
landscape where threat actors are constantly finding new ways of exploiting its target. Treating 
the history attribute as one of the main components for likelihood of initiation can lead to 
underestimating or missing critical threats.  
It should also be noted the history attribute is to be rated as a frequency. For example, the rating 
“high” for the history threat attribute is characterised as:  
“The threat is known to have initiated multiple and varied threat events…relating to the 
environment over a predefined period of time (e.g. the previous 12 months).” 
In the current risk scoring system, it is reasonable that rating the history threat attribute is based 
on the frequency of occurrence. A logical train of thought when considering a potential threat 
event would be to ask, “Has this happened before?” If yes, “how many times has this event 
occurred in the past e.g. year”. On the other hand, the threat attributes capability, motivation and 
commitment are not treated as frequencies, which is worth noting. According to Flage & Røed 
(2012), when establishing likelihood categories, a decision must be made regarding the choice 
of likelihood unit. Clearly, this har not been done in IRAM2. 
4.3.2 Risk output 
IRAM2 attempts to unify information risk assessments with operational risk assessments and is 
apparently successful in its attempt to transform information risks. However, when examining 
the resulting risk output from the methodology, it does in fact not translate well into an overall 
ERM risk picture. The risk scoring system outputs a two-dimensional index where the 
likelihood dimension is based on a combination of qualitative criteria for each relevant risk 
driver (history, motivation, capability and commitment for adversarial threats), and the residual 
impact is a function of threat strength and control strength. To illustrate the issue with this 
output, the likelihood of initiation dimension will be considered.  
Assume that the business impact categories covering monetary losses are the same categories 
used in other departments, i.e. the consequence scale used for determining financial risks is the 
same scale as used for determining consequences of information risks. Furthermore, assume that 
a risk practitioner wants to describe the total risk picture for the organisation in a risk matrix, 
covering all the different departmental risks. The practitioner is now faced with a problem with 





Figure 6 - InfoSec risk output and enterprise risk output 
Illustrated in Figure 6, it is not clear what a “high” likelihood on the y-axis in the information 
risk matrix would correspond to in the overall ERM risk matrix. 
Risk matrices have some clear strengths, as discussed in Section 2.3. They are simple to use and 
can communicate risk results in an intuitive fashion. However, one must be careful when using 
categories that introduce quantities that are hard to explain (see (Aven, 2015, p. 145), such as 0-
3 used in IRAM2. There is a prioritised residual risk profile accompanying the risk matrix in 
IRAM2. This list gives an overview over: 
 threat 
 threat event 
 residual likelihood 
 residual impact rating 
 residual risk rating 
Presenting the risk output this way clearly states what the magnitude of the likelihood and the 
impact is. This provides more information regarding a risk, compared to just listing the residual 
risk rating without the corresponding dimensions that output the risk.  
4.3.3 Background knowledge and uncertainty 
The methodology does not highlight the importance of quality of background knowledge and 
the hidden uncertainties, nor does it incorporate the strength of knowledge in the risk 
presentation. To properly describe risk there is a need to see beyond the 




event given some background knowledge. The example in (Aven, 2015, pp. 24-25) illustrates 
the issue:  
For a coin toss with a normal coin you assign the probability of heads to be 0.5. This probability 
judgement can be based on that the symmetry of the coin means both sides are equally likely, 
and that your experience with this specific coin supports getting head about half the time you 
throw it. The background knowledge for this probability assignment can be considered strong. 
Next situation, you are to assign the probability of a new and unknown (to you) coin. This coin 
could be a fake, designed to land more often on, e.g. heads than tails. You do not have this 
information and will probably assign a probability of 0.5 for heads, but now the background 
knowledge is weak. Both situations are assigned the same probability, but for the first situation 
the background knowledge is strong, while for the second situation the background knowledge 
is weak.  
This shows the importance of considering the background knowledge when assessing the 
strength of an assigned likelihood/probability. Applied to information security, knowing the 
background knowledge can be crucial in situations such as when there is a need to prioritise 
which threats to implement measures against. After having derived the residual risk rating in the 
last step IRAM2, for each information risk and having created a prioritised residual risk profile, 
there is no information regarding the strength of the background knowledge for the risks that 
have been calculated.  
4.4 Other 
Business impact ratings 
Business impact rating definitions in the financial category suffer overlap (see Table B.2: 
Example of a business impact reference table in IRAM2 (2017, p. 22)). The financial numbers 
defining each category “negligible”, “low”, “moderate” and “high”, are respectively “<5k”, 
“<50k”, “<150k” and “>150k”. Mathematically, the “moderate” level covers the lower 
categories, making them redundant. The same problem is present for the percentage division for 
each category.  
Threat attribute definitions 
It is not clear how to interpret some of the threat profiling reference tables (TPRT) in Appendix 
D (Information Security Forum, 2017, pp. 65-69). Regarding the adversarial profiling of threat 
attributes capability and motivation, the table does not explicitly state if one, some, or all points 
for each rating needs to be fulfilled to classify as a specific rating. This is a central part of 
determining the likelihood of success and should be clearly defined.  
The rating for the threat attribute “commitment” description suggests that it is needed in-depth 




“…threat expends at least 50% of its effort and/or computing/network resources initiating 
threat events against the organisation’s information systems being assessed, for a significant 
period of time (e.g. from weeks to months).”  
It can be questioned how realistic it is to possess such accurate information regarding the threat 
actors.  
4.5 Conclusion 
IRAM2 is a practical methodology that complies with many of the guidelines in ISO. There are 
several holistically good aspects of the methodology in terms of the assessment process and 
having good principles. However, this work has also exposed weaknesses in the methodology, 
such as in the calculation methods used. Below is a summary of the advantages and limitations 
found throughout this work.  
 
Advantages Limitations 
 Concepts tailored towards InfoSec 
are well-defined and precise 
 Complies with most of ISO 
guidelines on principles for effective 
risk management 
 Process structure is closely related to 
the tried and tested ISO process, and 
is easy to follow 
 Methodology covers the whole 
lifecycle of risk management 
 Generic, basic concepts related to the 
risk field are not good 
 Risk calculation methods seem 
arbitrary and unreliable 
 Risk scoring system is flawed 
 Risk matrix output does not translate 
well into how risk is considered in 
most enterprise risk management 
methods 
 Does not highlight the importance of 
background knowledge and 
uncertainty 
 Business impact ratings need 
correction 







5 Improving IRAM2 and information security risk assessments 
in general 
Figure 5 illustrates the connection between operational risk, information risk and IRAM2. As 
explained in Section 2.4, information risk is a sub-domain of operational risk. Information risks 
are commonly assessed using the three-factor approach. In accordance with this perspective, 
IRAM2 uses the three-factor approach as input and outputs residual risk ratings in a risk matrix 
with the commonly used dimensions of consequence (impact) on the x-axis and likelihood on 
the y-axis. Further use of this risk assessment would be to appropriately inform the management 
at the corporate level about the risk picture within operational risk, as part of an overall risk 
picture. Ideally, these information risks are then input into the overall operational risk picture, 
conveniently being on the same form.  
 
Figure 7 – Connection between operational risk and IRAM2 
From examining the findings, IRAM2 manages to unify information security with operational 
risk to some degree. As explained with reference to Figure 7, with the three-factor risk 
assessment model as input, IRAM2 outputs a risk matrix that can be further connected to how 
risk is assessed in operational risk assessments. However, there is room for improvements in 
several aspects alluded to in Section 4. Some of these issues are well-known within the 
scientific field of risk and are not specific only for IRAM2. The main contribution from this 
report will be to look at a select few issues that, by improving them, could help ensure a more 
balanced reporting of information security risks to the top management and the board. These 




 Add a set of criteria for assessing the strength of knowledge related to the probabilities.  
 Improve risk scoring system 
 Clarify subjective probabilities/qualitative judgements. 
In addition, some minor quick fixes to IRAM2 will also be suggested.  
5.1 Criteria for strength of knowledge 
The assigned probabilities for likelihood of initiation, threat strength and control strength are 
based on some knowledge (assumptions, data/information, expert knowledge, etc.), but this is 
not reflected in the results. As argued in Section 2.2, to describe risk there is a need to see 
beyond the likelihoods/probabilities. They only express the degree of belief regarding the 
occurrence of an event, given some background knowledge, and the strength of this knowledge 
may vary. Knowing the strength levels that lie behind the residual risks can be crucial 
information when deciding how to prioritise risk reducing measures. Think of two situations 
(Askeland, Flage, & Aven, 2017, p. 2): one where the practitioner has strong background 
knowledge supporting the probability and consequence assignments of a threat event. Call this 
risk for R1 and say that it was rated “moderate”. And another where, the practitioner has weak 
background knowledge supporting the probability and consequence assignments of a second 
threat event. Call this risk for R2 and say it was rated “moderate”, i.e. same rating as the first 
risk. These two situations are different with respect to risk. Since R2 is based on weak 
background knowledge, maybe it is in reality a “high” risk. But, the probabilities themselves do 
not reflect the uncertainty tied to the assumptions made regarding the risk.  
This limitation of probability can be solved by adding judgements in regards to the strength of 
knowledge (SoK) about the probability assignments (Askeland et al., 2017, p. 2). To properly 
characterise risk, the suggestion is to better reflect the knowledge aspect of risk by using a set of 
criteria to assess the strength of knowledge.  
Building on the risk concept and characterisation introduced in Section 2, the uncertainty 
measure Q will cover subjective (knowledge-based/judgemental) probabilities P, or related 
interval (imprecision) probabilities, and judgement of the strength of the knowledge K (SoK) 
supporting these probabilities (Aven, 2017, p. 3). Thus, Q = (P,SoK).  
To assess the strength of knowledge, a scoring system similar to what is recommended by 
Askeland, Flage & Aven (2017), can be used. Following are proposed criteria for the 
classification for strength of knowledge (SoK), adjusted to fit IRAM2. The SoK categories 
range from strong, moderate, to weak. It is proposed to assess the SoK for each threat.  
Strong (All conditions are fulfilled, whenever relevant) 
1. The threat profile is well understood 
a. Threat origin is known 
b. Relevant threat attributes are well understood 




a. Threat event catalogue used for scoping has required accuracy 
b. Threat is identified and mapped to each in-scope threat event 
c. Information assets impacted by each threat event is identified and mapped 
d. Highest realistic and worst-case impact assessments for confidentiality, integrity 
and availability for each information asset is considered to be accurate 
3. Much reliable data are available 
4. There is broad agreement among experts 
5. The knowledge K has not been scrutinised 
Moderate 
Conditions between strong and weak 
Weak (At least one of the conditions are fulfilled) 
1. The threat profile is not considered well understood 
a. Threat origin is unknown 
b. Relevant threat attributes are considered poorly understood 
2. Associated threat events that a threat could initiate are not well understood 
a. Threat event catalogue is incomplete/not up to date/inaccurate 
b. Threat and in-scope threat event relationships are unclear 
c. Information assets impacted by each threat event identification and mapping is 
incomplete/inaccurate 
d. Highest realistic and worst-case impact assessments for confidentiality, integrity 
and availability for each information asset is considered to be inaccurate 
3. No reliable data are available 
4. There is considerable disagreement among experts 
5. The knowledge K has been thoroughly scrutinised 
Using the prioritised residual risk profile table from IRAM2 (2017, p. 51) as basis, the SoK 
criteria could be reported as shown in Table 19. 
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The framework should cover phenomenological understanding/models, data, expert statements 
and assumptions and also the extent to which the knowledge base has been scrutinised 
(Askeland et al., 2017, p. 6). This is just a first attempt at constructing useful criteria for the 
information security field.  
The likelihood dimension within information security is inherently challenging to determine. 
Since the likelihood is mostly based on qualitative judgements, at least within IRAM2, it is 
important that the strength of knowledge is assessed and expressed. This will ensure that no 
more weight is placed on the probability numbers than can be justified (Askeland et al., 2017, p. 
7). 
5.2 Risk scoring system 
It is recommended to make changes to the current risk scoring tables used in IRAM2 and how to 
derive the ratings. Table 20 shows the IRAM2 risk factor scoring table that is used for both 
likelihood of initiation and threat strength.  








Table 20 – IRAM2 risk factor scoring table 
As explained in Section 3.4.3, the history attribute rating is summed with a motivation attribute 
rating to get the total score for the likelihood of initiation. This is not a reliable approach (see 
Section 4.3.1) and will be illustrated with two examples for the derivation of likelihood of 
initiation. First example uses the old risk scoring system and the second example will 








The practitioner is to determine the correct rating for the history attribute for threat X. By 
reading the Threat Profiling Reference Tables (Information Security Forum, 2017, p. 66), the 
practitioner decides that the highest rating, 3, is the correct one:  
“The threat is known to have initiated multiple and varied threat events (e.g. reconnaissance, 
physical attack, gaining unauthorised access and theft of information) relating to the 
environment over a predefined period of time (e.g. the previous 12 months)” 
Next, the practitioner is to set the rating for the threat attribute “motivation”. To the knowledge 
of the practitioner, this threat is not expected to have any motivation for targeting the 
practitioner’s organisation. The rating that aligns with this characterisation: 
“The threat is not expected to initiate a threat event against the environment” 
This corresponds to a “negligible” rating, zero. Total risk factor score for this threat is, by 
summing the two scores and looking at Table 21, results in a “moderate” rating, 3.  
New system 
Instead of an arbitrary summing system, it is recommended to treat the threat attribute 
assessment differently. The suggestion is to assign a LoI probability, based on what the 
practitioner knows regarding the relevant threat attributes. In this case, the practitioner makes 
use of the same Threat Profiling Reference Tables for history and motivation. Based on this 
knowledge, he sets a total probability for threat X, using Table 21.  
 





Table 21 - Proposed risk scoring table 
The practitioner has information that the threat is known to have initiated multiple and varied 
threat events the last 12 months. As far as the practitioner knows, this threat should not be 
motivated to initiate threat events. There is no reason to believe that this threat is expected to 
initiate a threat against the environment. However, this is the case, even though the practitioner 




the practitioner judges this threat as very relevant, despite not understanding the threat’s 
motivation. The result of this assessment: 
𝑃(𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑋|ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦, 𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 
This approach makes use of the information in IRAM2 found in the Threat Profiling Reference 
Tables. Furthermore, it does not restrict the threat level for a certain threat, based on e.g. having 
no prior knowledge about history. The old method would limit the potential threat to a 
“moderate” level in that case. This new system appreciates that a threat could still be rated e.g. 
“high” despite lacking information on one of the threat attributes.  
Table 21 can also be used to determine Likelihood of success (LoS). LoS consists of the two 
components Threat Strength (TS) and Control Strength (CS). TS can then be considered as 
inherent LoS (that is LoI x TS equals inherent likelihood), while CS and TS together give 
residual LoS. CS should in this context be seen as a percentage reduction in the threat strength.  
5.3 Other improvements 
Following there will be presented other suggestions for improvements.  
Clarifying subjective probabilities  
It is crucial that the meaning of the probabilities is communicated when reporting risk 
assessment results. Subjective probability is characterised by an individual’s personal degree of 
belief whether a specific outcome is likely to occur (Oredsson, 2017). This is important to 
convey, because people will interpret prior knowledge about an event differently. If the risk 
practitioner assigns a probability of, e.g. 0.9 for a specific threat event within the next 12 
months, he needs a way to explain what this statement means. To ensure proper communication 
of subjective probabilities, it is advised to use an uncertainty standard proposed by Dennis 
Lindley, which Aven (2013, p. 2) is an advocate of:  
“If a person assigns a probability of 0.1 (say) for an event A, he or she compares his/her 
uncertainty (degree of belief) of A occurring with drawing a specific ball from an urn 
containing 10 balls. The uncertainty (degree of belief) is the same.”  
With this standard, common probability rules can be established. Presenting subjective 
probability in this way makes it easy to communicate as it separates between uncertainty and 
utility (Oredsson, 2017, p. 8). This interpretation can be used in any type of setting and does not 
require any formal education in statistics to understand the meaning of it.  
Business impact assessment intervals 
Business impact rating definitions in the financial category that suffer overlap (see Section 4.4): 
This problem is easily solved by defining unambiguous intervals for each impact rating. In this 
case, the impact ratings from negligible to high should be defined as: [0, 5k), [5k, 50k), [50k, 
150k), [150k, inf). Square brackets indicate that the corresponding starting point is included in 





6.1 Overall considerations 
IRAM2 is a comprehensive methodology that covers not only the risk assessment process, but 
also gives the practitioner in-depth knowledge of risk from ISF’s perspective. Risk is a 
fundamental concept in the context of information risk. Therefore, it is important that the 
practitioner receives some education on risk conceptualisation. However, some of the generic 
concepts related to risk have been criticised in this report, such as likelihood and risk. IRAM2 
emphasises the importance of engaging the right stakeholders. The practitioners of IRAM2 is 
presented with a complete ‘package’ in this sense, that covers the whole lifecycle of risk 
management. It has some real advantages, such as a process structure that is very similar to ISO 
31000 (2018), which is trusted in many industries.   
Today, information security risk assessments are commonly based on threats, vulnerabilities 
and asset evaluations. IRAM2 uses this approach and outputs a risk matrix. Limitations have 
been identified in IRAM2 in connection with how the risk assessments are carried out. One of 
the critical limitations of this methodology is in relation to the derivation of information risks.  
The information risk equation used in IRAM2 builds on the traditional equation where risk is the 
product of likelihood and impact. But, the two components are not multiplied at any stage. The 
equation is decomposed into several different levels, best illustrated by Figure 4 in Section 3.4. 
Likelihood of initiation (LoI) and threat strength (TS) are derived by summing certain threat 
attributes to reach a risk score. The limitations of the derivation of LoI has been discussed, 
which is two-fold; using the threat attribute history as a factor that drives the rating, and the 
summing of the threat attributes. The latter is the same issue found with the derivation of TS. 
Furthermore, the control strength (CS), which has not been discussed, is derived by applying a 
formula (see Section 3.4.4). This formula accounts for the relevance of the control and the level 
of implementation of the control. It seems logical that the control strength is dependent on these 
two factors. However, further work would be needed to verify if the approach for determining 
control strength is reliable.  
The methodology uses matrices for two different means, namely as a classification matrix and a 
traditional matrix with impact on the x-axis and likelihood on the y-axis. The likelihood of 
success is found after determining the threat strength and control strength. This is done by using 
the classification matrix to read off the correct rating for Likelihood of success (LoS) (see Table 
16 in Section 3.4.5). The residual likelihood is then found by using another classification matrix 
to read off the rating that intersects LoI and LoS (see Table 17 in Section 3.4.5). Finally, after 
having determined the residual impact, the residual risk can be determined. This shows that 
there are many steps that need to be taken to eventually reach a risk score, and one can assume 
that the process quickly gets complex as the practitioner attempts to map all relevant risks that 




Having finished this process, the practitioner can present the information risks in a risk matrix. 
Alternatively, the practitioner can choose to present the prioritised residual risk profile in a table 
as suggested in IRAM2. The output from IRAM2 does not reconcile with risk output from risk 
domains on higher levels, such as operational risk. The risk output from IRAM2 is not in 
absolute terms and there is no clear way of how to convert them. With the current approach, 
there is no way of combining information risk assessments with enterprise risk management 
reporting, as shown in Section 4.3.1. Enterprise risk management models are designed to 
compare risk levels for all types of domains. This means that the risk dimensions, e.g. (C,P), 
must be on the same form. This poses a challenge for the risk practitioner that needs to 
disseminate the results in combination with other risk domains to the top management.  
6.2 Bridging the gap 
Improvements are proposed regarding strength of knowledge criteria, improving risk scoring 
system and clarifying subjective probabilities. Incorporating these improvements will aid in 
bridging the gap between information security assessments and enterprise risk management 
reporting. But, to reach the full potential of the provided improvements, more work is needed.  
Strength of knowledge 
The strength of knowledge criteria can be an important aid in expressing the assessor’s 
knowledge regarding the subjective judgements. But the suggestion in Section 5.1 can be 





















Moderate Weak High Strong High 
Table 22 - Residual risk profile with SoK judgements for likelihood and impact 
This results in more accurate assessments of the strength of knowledge, as the criteria is tailored 
specifically to each of the two dimensions. The practitioner can then communicate more 
accurately what the results are built on. Table 22 is an example of what this should look like, by 






Risk scoring system 
By changing the risk scoring system as proposed in Section 5.2, IRAM2 can output probability 
estimates that correspond with other risk management models. By also making changes to the 
consequence dimension, the information risk assessments from IRAM2 can be represented in an 
overall risk management model. If the probabilities were derived as suggested in Section 5.2, 
they would be assigned as probability intervals, which correspond to more commonly used 
dimensions. But, these probabilities make more sense if they are defined within a certain time 
frame. It is suggested to convert them into a frequency, the expected rate of occurrence in a 
standard unit if time, which is usually a year. 
The idea of using the Threat Profiling Reference Tables provided in IRAM2 as basis for setting 
an overall rating needs more work. The approach should be structured and easy to follow for the 
risk practitioner. This is important because it will help in producing consistent and reliable 
assessments. After making the changes suggested regarding the scoring system, a natural segue 
would be to assess if the list of threat attributes characterising adversarial threats is complete. 
As stated in (Wangen, Shalaginov, & Hallstensen, 2016), the threat assessment process relies on 
the quality of threat intelligence and understanding of the adversary. Maybe other threat 
attributes should be considered, such as; motive, primary intent, preferred targets or personal 
risk tolerance (Freund & Jones, 2014).  
It cannot be claimed that the complete answer to bridging the gap between information security 
and enterprise risk management has been found. However, the gap will be smaller if the 
proposed improvements are implemented. IRAM2 is a methodology with many holistically good 
aspects in terms of the assessment process and having good principles. With some further work 
on the suggested improvements, IRAM2 could be a viable option as a risk assessment 
framework that fits within an overall enterprise risk management model.  
6.3 Further work 
Other aspects of IRAM2 not covered 
As mentioned in Section 6.1, the control strength formula has not been evaluated in this report. 
The formula consists of two components; control relevance and control implementation. It 
would be necessary to evaluate this formula and the related scoring table and find a good way to 
implement the new scoring system. IRAM2 provides Control relevance tables (CRT) which aid 
the practitioner in understanding a control’s ability to deliver protection. A control library is 
also available. These are comprehensive tables. It would be of interest to investigate how often 
these lists should be updated to stay relevant in the ever-evolving cyber threat landscape. This 
also holds true for what types of threat events one can expect.  
The procedure for setting the residual business impact rating would also be of importance for 
further work. In IRAM2, the practitioner first decides on the inherent business impact for each 




this rating. This is done by using the Likelihood of success matrix, which is connected to 
Control strength and Threat strength.  
The focus has been on adversarial threats throughout this work. Accidental and environmental 
threats should also be investigated to look for potential improvements in how they are assessed. 
They are built on the same reasoning as adversarial threats, and most likely there are only small 
adjustments necessary to make the proposed improvements applicable to the other threat 
categories.  
The use of subjective probabilities within the security domain has a well-known problem 
((Aven, 2014, p. 10), (Brown & Jr, 2011)) which should be just as relevant for the information 
security domain and is worth mentioning. Specifying the subjective probabilities is connected 
directly to risk management responses. The issue that is pointed to is the fact that the behaviour 
of human threat actors may vary depending on what they know regarding what we, as the 
analysts, know. For example, the practitioner might assign a high likelihood score for a specific 
threat event, resulting in that this type of threat is prioritised, and protective measures are 
implemented. But because of this fact, the potential threat actor might conclude (after gathering 
information, doing reconnaissance) that the probability of success for this attack has now been 
reduced to the point that it is not worth engaging an attack. The result is that the risk 
practitioner’s initial assigning of a high likelihood can no longer be considered high, but the 
practitioner has no way of knowing this. Cox (2008, p. 11) argues that threat estimates might be 
self-defeating if the attackers use intelligence about the defender’s own threat estimates to help 
decide where and when to attack. The context is terrorist attacks, but the same principles could 
be applicable to the behaviour of threat actors within information security.  
Bayesian networks 
A Bayesian network (BN) is a probabilistic model based on directed acyclic graphs. Directed 
acyclic graphs are finite directed graphs with no directed cycles (Pearl, 2011). The BN 
visualises the causal interactions for certain problem domains and can be useful for modelling 
uncertainty in security analysis (Xie, Li, Ou, Liu, & Levy, 2010). One suggestion for further 





Figure 8 - BN for IRAM2 
A starting point for this work is to rearrange the information risk equation as proposed in Figure 
8. C1 is the residual risk, C2 residual impact, C3 residual likelihood, C4 likelihood of initiation 
and C5 is likelihood of success. The specific expression for the compound distribution 
described by this network: 
𝑃(𝑐 , … , 𝑐 ) =  𝑃 𝑐 𝑝𝑎(𝑐 ) = 𝑃(𝑐 , |𝑐 , 𝑐 ) × 𝑃(𝑐 ) × 𝑃(𝑐 |𝑐 , 𝑐 ) × 𝑃(𝑐 ) × 𝑃(𝑐 ) 
The models are easy to update with new information and provides a systematic approach for 
combining knowledge (Oredsson, 2017, p. 13). The evidence suggests that a BN can be a good 
approach for assessing information risks, as the method can model situations where little data is 
available but there is expert knowledge regarding a threat. The BN can handle uncertainty 
efficiently, although it depends on having informative priors which will lead to higher accuracy 
in the posterior inferences (S. D. Guikema, 2007). Turning IRAM2 into a Bayesian network 
could be an interesting approach and in combination with the advantages of IRAM2, such as 
having good framework principles and a structured process, could potentially turn it into the 









Current practice for information security risk assessment, as represented by IRAM2, has been 
evaluated in this report. At present time, information security risk assessment methods are not 
well integrated into operational risk/enterprise risk management models. Several weaknesses 
have been found in IRAM2. The most significant relate to calculation methods, a flawed risk 
scoring system, and a risk matrix output that does not translate well into how risk is considered 
in most risk management models. The methodology does not highlight the importance of 
background knowledge and hidden uncertainties. Section 4.3.2 shows that IRAM2 does not 
unify information security risk assessments with risk assessments in other risk domains that 
exist within an enterprise. The suggestions that are provided will improve IRAM2, and the 
information security risk field in general. These suggestions include adding a set of criteria for 
strength of knowledge related to the qualitative judgements of the likelihood of a threat, and 
change the risk scoring system so that the risk output can be presented in risk matrices at the 
corporate level. A suggestion is presented on how to advance the reporting of information risks 
to the decision makers. To clarify subjective probabilities, it is recommended to use an 
uncertainty standard. The complete answer to bridging the gap between information security 
and enterprise risk management has not been found, however, several improvements have been 







Andress, J. (2014). The basics of information security: understanding the fundamentals of 
InfoSec in theory and practice: Syngress. 
Askeland, T., Flage, R., & Aven, T. (2017). Moving beyond probabilities–strength of 
knowledge characterisations applied to security. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 159, 196-205.  
Aven, T. (2010). On how to define, understand and describe risk. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety, 95(6), 623-631.  
Aven, T. (2011a). Misconceptions of risk: John Wiley & Sons. 
Aven, T. (2011b). On how to conceptualise and describe risk. Reliability: Theory & 
Applications, 6(1 (20)).  
Aven, T. (2011c). On the new ISO guide on risk management terminology. Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety, 96(7), 719-726. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2010.12.020 
Aven, T. (2013). On the meaning of a black swan in a risk context. Safety Science, 57, 44-51. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.01.016 
Aven, T. (2014). Risk, surprises and black swans : fundamental ideas and concepts in risk 
assessment and risk management. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor 
& Francis Group. 
Aven, T. (2015). Risk analysis. Chichester, West Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley. 
Aven, T. (2017). Improving risk characterisations in practical situations by highlighting 
knowledge aspects, with applications to risk matrices. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 167, 42-48. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2017.05.006 
Aven, T., & Reniers, G. (2013). How to define and interpret a probability in a risk and safety 
setting. Safety Science, 51(1), 223-231. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2012.06.005 
Brown, G. G., & Jr, L. A. C. (2011). How Probabilistic Risk Assessment Can Mislead 
Terrorism Risk Analysts. Risk Analysis, 31(2), 196-204. doi:10.1111/j.1539-
6924.2010.01492.x 
Committee, C. A. S. E. R. M. (2003). Overview of enterprise risk management. Fairfax, VA: 




Cox Jr, L. A. T. (2008). Some limitations of “Risk= Threat× Vulnerability× Consequence” for 
risk analysis of terrorist attacks. Risk Analysis, 28(6), 1749-1761.  
Cox, L. A. (2008). What's wrong with risk matrices? Risk Analysis, 28(2), 497-512. 
doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01030.x 
D’Arcy, S. P., & Brogan, J. C. (2001). Enterprise risk management. Journal of Risk 
Management of Korea, 12(1), 207-228.  
Flage, R., & Røed, W. (2012). A reflection on some practices in the use of risk matrices. Paper 
presented at the 11th International Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 
Conference and the Annual European Safety and Reliability Conference 2012, PSAM11 
ESREL 2012. 
Freund, J., & Jones, J. (2014). Measuring and managing information risk: a FAIR approach: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Guikema, S. (2012). Modeling intelligent adversaries for terrorism risk assessment: Some 
necessary conditions for adversary models. Risk Analysis, 32(7), 1117-1121.  
Guikema, S. D. (2007). Formulating informative, data-based priors for failure probability 
estimation in reliability analysis. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 92(4), 490-
502.  
Information Security Forum. (2017). Information Risk Assessment Methodology 2 (IRAM2). In 
The next generation of assessing information risk: Information Security Forum Limited. 
International Organization for Standardization. (2011). NS-ISO 27005:2011. In Information 
technology - Security techniques - Information security risk management (pp. 76). 
International Organization for Standardization. (2013). NS-ISO/IEC 27001:2013. In 
Information technology - Security techniques - Information security management 
systems - Requirements (pp. 23). Norway: Standard Norge. 
International Organization for Standardization. (2017). NS-ISO 27000:2017. In Information 
technology - Security techniques - Information security management systems - Overview 
and vocabulary (pp. 34). Norway: Standard Norge. 
International Organization for Standardization. (2018). NS-ISO 31000:2018. In Risk 
management - Guidelines (pp. 28). Norway: Standard Norge. 
Oredsson, M. (2017). RIS610 Selected topics in risk management. Retrieved from N/A 
Pearl, J. (2011). Bayesian networks.  





SRA. (2015). SRA Glossary. In Society for Risk Analysis Glossary. 
http://www.sra.org/sites/default/files/pdf/SRA_glossary_20150622.pdf. 
Supervision, B. C. o. B. (2011). Principles for the Sound Management of Operational Risk. In. 
www.bis.org: Bank for International Settlements. 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. (2018). Enterprise 
Risk Management - Integrated Framework. Retrieved from 
https://www.coso.org/Pages/erm-integratedframework.aspx 
von Solms, R. (1998). Information security management (3): the Code of Practice for 
Information Security Management (BS 7799). Information Management & Computer 
Security, 6(5), 224-225. doi:10.1108/09685229810240158 
Wangen, G., Shalaginov, A., & Hallstensen, C. (2016). Cyber Security Risk Assessment of a 
DDoS Attack. Paper presented at the International Conference on Information Security. 
Xie, P., Li, J. H., Ou, X., Liu, P., & Levy, R. (2010). Using Bayesian networks for cyber 
security analysis. Paper presented at the Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN), 
2010 IEEE/IFIP international conference on. 
 
